
Japan in the Orient: Part One: Korea

Author(s): George Trumbull Ladd

Source: *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Oct., 1915), pp. 113-144

Published by:

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29738118>

Accessed: 01-08-2014 01:09 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



<http://www.jstor.org>

THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT

Vol. 6

OCTOBER, 1915

No. 2

JAPAN IN THE ORIENT

PART ONE—KOREA

By George Trumbull Ladd, LL.D., Professor in Yale University; author of "In Korea with Marquis Ito"

Near the close of his second period of office as Japan's ambassador at Washington, Baron Takahira was for a day or two my guest. During an evening's conversation on the traditional and present relations of the two countries, the Baron asked this question: "Why is it, Professor Ladd, that your people so persist in misunderstanding my people?" As coming from one who was at the same time so sincere a patriot and so true and intelligent a friend of the United States, and as appreciated by the tone in which it was put, the question had about it a quite genuine touch of pathos. But it threw the one of whom the question was asked into a conflict between the obligation to be truthful and a sort of perhaps not altogether dishonorable patriotic shame. What could be said without violence to either feeling was this: On the part of the Japanese themselves there is a lack of that frankness and openness of manner and speech which has been rather characteristic of English-speaking peoples, even in difficult matters of internal politics or of foreign diplomacy; and that the American public on their part are woefully and even criminally ignorant of the real nature of Oriental methods and Oriental affairs, while at the same time assuming—too often in an offensive way—their own superiority to those methods and their own untrained ability to decide questions, for the sane and wise decision of which they have had little or no preparation whatever.

But there were at that time, and there have been up to the present hour, more sinister and unworthy causes for this misunderstanding on the part of perhaps a majority of the American public. Of such causes the most perniciously active are these three: The greed and dishonesty of a crowd of promoters and seekers for all kinds of concessions; a prejudiced or even subsidized press; and the mean jealousy and political intrigue of the labor unions and so-called agriculturists, especially, of course, on our southern Pacific Coast.

The result of all this has been a very unfortunate change in the attitude of the people of Japan toward the people of the United States. Down to the last of my three visits to Japan (1906-1907) America was the most admired and beloved of all foreign nations by all classes of the Japanese. But when the troops came down from the northern part of the Empire to be embarked for the siege of Tsing Tau, the common people quite generally supposed that war had been declared upon the United States. Nor will it do to conceal this ugly feeling—not at all unnatural, considering the years of provocation which have resulted in bringing it about—by attributing it to the “jingoese” and to the papers under their control. The last January’s number of *The Japan Peace Movement* quotes from a speech recently made as “an expression of opinion on the Japan-American question” by a “well-known university professor.” The words quoted are in part as follows:

The good and friendly feelings which Japanese entertained toward Americans until some ten years ago have entirely cooled down, because of the proposition for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, the immigration question, etc., etc. Now the majority of Japanese have come to observe every movement of America with doubt and distrust. For the sake of Japanese-American relations this is to be lamented. To restore Japan-American friendship to what it was ten years ago, and to establish permanent peace between the two nations, the first necessity is I think, that Americans show due respect to Japan and to Japanese. . . . The fact that Americans do not recognize the equality of “white” and “yellow” people is also a source of unfriendliness between the two peoples. . . . So long as she acts against Japanese only because they are “yellow,” and almost entirely pro-

hibits their entrance into her territory, and moreover persecutes in every possible way those who have legally entered and live there, the resentment of Japanese against America is not to be looked upon as without cause.

It was the opinion of those intimately acquainted with the facts, and it is still my own opinion, that the assassination of Prince Ito was largely chargeable to the behavior of American residents in Korea, and to the press which they influenced or controlled. On this point I quote from a letter bearing the date of April 9, 1908, and written by one thoroughly acquainted with the subjects of which he wrote.

The papers here have had some plain-spoken articles pointing out the responsibility of certain American agitators. . . . Now as to the question you have asked me, in your letter of February 13, to Mr. M——, I have gone into the matter quite in detail with Mr. T. R. Kennedy of the Associated Press, who is an admirable man and who has done good service to Japan since he took charge here last autumn. It seems that the anti-Japanese movement in the press is to be attributed to "instructions" rather than to the animus of individual men, though many of the disgruntled war-correspondents, such as . . . have willingly lent themselves to carrying out the instructions.

A definite case in point is that of the present correspondent of the *New York X*——, Mr. O., stationed at Yokohama. He has said to a friend of mine that he is here under instructions to create sentiment for Korea. He is not a young man and he says he does not believe what he writes: but what can he do?

There is much more in this letter, of the same kind, all very definite and with names and dates which can be given to the public at any time when it may seem fit.

In proof of the same contention I quote from a letter of June, 1910, which was written to me by one of the wisest and most unimpeachably honorable of all the Japanese of the highest official class, *anent* the American attitude toward the Manchurian and Korean questions.

It is really a universal misfortune that this press manipulation by mostly interested parties should exercise so much evil influence on international relations. . . . I think it is a remarkable fact for these past years that our press on the whole do not join the chorus of high-toned notes that are being scattered in all directions. . . . I suppose it is owing to the fact that on this side of the water there is no American question; people are not confronted with a practical problem. The great mass of the

people do not concern themselves with war scares. The present mischief has been brought about by the press and other public organs, and it is through this means that counteracting influence can be applied.

That it was largely the same sinister American influence which defeated the plans of Ito to reform and elevate the Korean common people, while leaving to them all that was possible of their national independence, I know as surely as anything of the kind can be known in the way of intimate personal knowledge. To this influence as exercised by the men of financial greed, the credulity and unwisdom of the men sincerely interested in matters of education and religion—"the more's the pity"—lent themselves.

The storm over the dealings of the Japanese government with Korea is now, for its own sake simply, relegated to ancient history. And until recently, the current opinion both in Korea and in the United States, as well as in the world at large, was more and more justifying these dealings, by their fruits and in all important ways. But very recently, similar causes of misunderstanding and of growing hostility have been revived in respect of Japan's accomplished or prospective dealings with China. This seems to me to make highly desirable a revision, from an inside point of view, of the events of ten, or fewer, years ago, as they occurred in Korea, with a purpose to interpret the better Japan's place in the Orient; and thus to avoid the same dangerous mistakes, and check the same evil influences, with their mischievous tendencies, touching the position of Japan toward China, and the development of the Orient generally. For this reason I rehearse, among other considerations, some of the facts known to me on the best of evidence, but not likely to become known to the American public in any other way.

The critical periods in the relations of Japan and Korea during the last ten or twelve years, and those at which the conduct of the Japanese government has been most subject to unfavorable foreign criticisms, have been these three: The establishment of the protectorate; the enforcement of annexation; and the suppression of the conspiracy of assassination in 1911 to 1913.

For five hundred years the weakness and corruption of the government of Korea had been a menace to the welfare and, at times, even to the integrity of Japan. But what had been for centuries true under the suzerainty of China had become much more alarmingly true under the dominance of Russian influence. Under the intrigues of M. Pavloff, not only had a large extent of territory been staked off, and the beginnings of a fort made, on the Korean side of the Yalu River; but the Korean Emperor was being put under pressure to concede a fortified port to Russia, at the southern end of the Korean peninsula, from which the entrance to the Japan Sea could be commanded, and shells from a modern gun thrown upon an island belonging to Japan. Moreover, Russia was persistently refusing to recognize the territorial rights of China in Manchuria. War had broken out between Russia and Japan; but only a few days before its outbreak a boat had been picked up in the Yellow Sea which bore a Korean messenger with a letter to Port Arthur asking for Russian troops to be sent to Korea.

If ever a stronger nation has the right, in the interests of its own highest welfare, and for the security even of its national existence, to assume at least partial and temporary control of another weaker nation, Japan had that right over Korea, in 1904. Nor is there less doubt, as subsequent events have amply proved, and are proving more amply with every passing year, that what was a political necessity for Japan, was an inestimable political and social benefit for Korea.

The completer inauguration of the Japanese protectorate over Korea was preceded by two "Protocols," one signed February 23, 1904, and the other August 22, of the same year. Of these documents the earlier bound the imperial government of Korea to afford "full facilities to promote the action of the Japanese imperial government," and to adopt its advice in regard "to improvements in administration;" in turn, it definitely guaranteed "the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire," and the "safety and repose of its imperial house." The second of these protocols engaged the Korean government to employ

a Japanese subject to revise its financial affairs, which were in a most disgraceful condition, and also some foreigner as its diplomatic representative, to whom all important matters dealing with foreigners should be entrusted. Mr. Megata and our countryman, Durham White Stevens, were the appointees; and no officials ever served their own country more devotedly than these two gentlemen served the degraded and utterly corrupt Korean government, and the wretched and hapless common people of Korea. But from the very first, they were both marked for assassination.

The first full and entirely accurate account ever given to the public, of the establishment of the Japanese protectorate over Korea in its completer form is to be found in Chapter XI, entitled "The Compact," of the book *In Korea With Marquis Ito*. This account was compiled from the first sources, including translations from the Japanese and Chinese documents, such as the letters exchanged between the emperors of Japan and Korea, the report of Marquis Ito to his own Emperor, and other similar sources. It was carefully revised in every detail by the Marquis himself, who was the principal actor in the transaction. But in some of the most important particulars it is amply confirmed by the celebrated *Memorial* afterward published in self-defense by the Korean ministers who represented their Emperor in the transaction. It is itself a sufficient refutation of the mistakes and falsehoods of the contradictory accounts given by either credulous or interested reporters of current rumors. With reference to them all, Marquis Ito once said to the writer, with a show of indignation quite unusual to him when discussing such matters: "Do these men then think that I would lie to my own Emperor?"

The *Compact*, or treaty which established the protectorate, gave all dealings between Korea and foreign nations into the hands of the Japanese government as represented by its Resident General; and it also placed upon him the responsibility of enacting needed reforms through the Korean

Ministry which was to remain, nominally at least, under the authority of the Korean Emperor.

That Marquis Ito in his office of Resident General went to work, and continued to the end working, with all his sagacity, influence, and powers of body and mind, for the good of the common people of Korea, I have never found any one who knew him and knew the facts, to express any doubt. I, who came to know both him and the facts, testify unqualifiedly to the sincere and sympathetic devotion which he continually bestowed upon his well-nigh impossible task. The desire to lift up the miserable multitudes of the Korean population and relieve them from the intolerable debasing misrule of their Emperor and of the Yangban classes, was ever in his heart and often on his lips. It was of this he spoke not infrequently in his public addresses; more frequently and more feelingly, in our private conversations. But the obstacles were enormous and, as the event proved, not quite attainable in his milder and more benevolent way. Of these obstacles the three principal were: first, a thoroughly base Emperor, with the most dangerous of all forms of baseness, that of unscrupulous selfishness mixed with incurable weakness; second, the corrupt Yangban, or gentleman and official class, of whom, especially among those who had the Emperor's favor there was scarcely a single one upon whom any dependence could be placed; and third, a considerable proportion of the resident foreigners, of whom it is a pity to have to say, the majority were American citizens. A few instances of a quite definite sort will illustrate the nature of such "goings on" in the Orient by some of our "nationals" better than pages of historical generalization or of declamatory description could possibly do. The more important of these items shall be taken either from official documents or from private letters furnished through the kindness of the late Durham White Stevens, whose official business it was to make himself thoroughly acquainted with such affairs. They are, in a way, typical of the methods of the foreign "promoter" in the Orient.

In a letter bearing date of Seoul, November, 1906, Mr.

Stevens informed Mr. Chapin, who was at that time counsel for the Japanese Embassy at Washington, of the real facts concerned in the charges against the Japanese government in Korea, which had been prepared by one of the directors of the C——— B——— Development Company (an American concern) for use by their attorney at Washington. The memorandum of charges was got before our government. The refutation in the form of a true recital of the facts never obtained that privilege. The accounts of this American company, as audited by Sir J. MacLeavy Brown, showed that this corporation of promoters had made several hundred thousand *Yen* out of the Korean Emperor on their concession for the Seoul-Chemulpo Railway alone—in which they were partners with his Majesty. The auditor disclosed *Yen*, 1,100,000 which he considered should be disallowed, and pronounced that the threatened foreclosure of the mortgage would be an act of gross injustice. The mortgage was nevertheless foreclosed. The transitional period of political agitation was particularly favorable to this and other foreign concessions. For the Emperor was ready to give away anything that might serve as an opportunity or a bribe to make trouble for the Japanese. I quote from the same letter:

Both the arrangement regarding the electric properties and the mining concession were secretly consummated. The intermediaries on the part of the palace were Hiun Sang Kun and Yi Hak Kiun, two Korean officials of minor rank belonging to the anti-Japanese party. Like others of the same party, these gentlemen had taken refuge at the outbreak of the war in a foreign house (Miss Sontag's) where their negotiations were carried on secretly with Mr. C. and Mr. B.

This contract was ante-dated, in order to make it appear as consummated before the Japanese took jurisdiction of such matters; and the Korean rascals who had done the "palace part of it" were spirited off to Shanghai on the American man-of-war, *Cincinnati*.

Although the Japanese authorities first learned of the agreement concerning the electric properties as early as the 19th of March, 1904, nothing was known about a mining con-

cession until the 4th of November, 1905, when the American minister addressed a note to the Korean minister for foreign affairs demanding possession of the Kapsan mining district in the name of the C——— B———Development Company. "This was the first official intimation made to the Korean government of the existence of any such concession, and no properly certified copy could ever be obtained."

As to the nature of this mining concession, I quote Mr. Stevens' written statement:

The document granting the so-called Kapsan mining concession is a most extraordinary paper. It gives C——— and B——— powers never before granted to foreigners. Among other provisions it actually provides that no concession shall be made to any one, native or foreigner, until C——— and B——— have made their choice. It is *contra bonos mores*, if ever a government concession was.

Later on, the consul general of the United States deemed it a matter for his government to take up, because Marquis Ito, as Resident General, wanted some other proof than the lady's (the wife of one of this company) bare word for it, that the Korean Emperor had made her a present of a valuable piece of real estate.

Another similar affair, but in every way of inferior significance, was organized by one Cavanaugh (also an American), a so-called "three-dollar-a-day man," who, however, posed as an expert mining engineer. In conjunction with certain Korean officials and ex-officials, he formed a company for the exploitation of coal mining, where there was no exportable coal, oil wells, where there was no oil, and mineral waters derived from sources possessing no medicinal value whatever. After getting more than *Yen* 300,000 from the gullible Korean Emperor, and other *Yen* 12,000, under the cover of back pay and through the desire of the Japanese to avoid a scandal and the chance of his fraud being made a matter for diplomatic interference, Cavanaugh went off to the United States to proclaim how the Japanese were suppressing American enterprise with high-handed acts of injustice. What wonder that the liar was believed when an accredited American newspaper writer, "who had associated

with a certain missionary set in Seoul," went back to tell the people that American business was being persistently suppressed by government action in Korea; and that the people had nothing to look forward to under the new order of things save "oppression, robbery, and even murder."

But the frauds and scandals which perplexed, and which so largely thwarted the benevolent plans of the Resident General for the welfare of the common people, were not confined to the circles of unscrupulous promoters or concessionaires. The generous gift of money sent from the United States for establishing the foreign Young Men's Christian Association in Seoul was in acute danger of being lost. A considerable percentage of the fifty thousand dollars had been put into the hands of one of the Korean members for the purchase of some of the nine pieces of land needed for the site of the proposed building. The young man had shared the privilege of handling the money, with a dishonest Japanese money-lender; and a dispute had arisen between the two as to which one had final possession of the funds. The Japanese swore he had returned the money; the Korean swore he had not. The oath of neither of them was good for a farthing. But the Japanese could show no receipt and the Japanese government forced him to pay. Another smaller sum, placed for a similar purpose in Korean hands, had been spent by the receiver on his mistress, one of the palace girls; and when his father, under threat of having his son put in prison, sent to Seoul the first installment of the stolen money by the hands of a younger brother, the enterprising youth spent it on a counterfeiting machine, and the distressed father had his attempt at restitution to begin over again.

Let it not be thought that membership in the Y. M. C. A. or in any of the missionary communions was a sure guarantee against any sort of vice or crime. No branch-societies of the former institution could safely be allowed beyond the immediate supervision of the foreign secretary in Seoul; for they at once became hotbeds of seditious plotting and even of assassination. The same thing was true to a less extent, of the Epworth League and the societies for Chris-

tian Endeavor. Murder and assassination were rife, not only or chiefly of the Japanese by the Koreans, but also of the Koreans by their own countrymen. Four attempts at murder of the Korean ministers by the party of the "outs"—one of them successful, another thwarted by the vigilance of a Japanese gendarme—were made during the months of April and May, 1907. The murders committed by brigands, outlaws, and the hired men of the intriguing Yangbans, were so common that nobody, "to the manner" wonted, if not "born," not even the missionaries, much less the native colporteurs and other professed converts, seemed to regard such events as particularly worthy of notice or their perpetrators particularly culpable.

The Emperor was relying on his distribution of favors as a means to gain for him the favor, and perhaps even the intervention, of the American government in Korean affairs. With this in view, he was ostensibly employing a missionary as his official physician. But this physician's medicine he did not take; he threw it out of the window and continued his resort to the ancestral methods of sooth-saying, propitiating the demons, and other medical practices derived from China. One traveling secretary of the international Y. M. C. A., in perfect innocence of the giver's point of view, had accepted from his Majesty a valuable pair of gold goblets. Concessions were still to be had for the asking, if only he who asked could make a show of "influence," and the gift could escape the vigilance of the government of the Resident General. But what made Ito's task most especially difficult was the fact that the really good and well-meaning section of the American foreign population were persistently, though in general ignorantly if not altogether innocently, acting so as to hinder rather than to help him.

Doubtless, such a condition of things will seem incredible to those of the American public who are even fairly honest and kindly and law-abiding themselves, but who have had no experience of the ways of foreigners, and not least their own nationals, under conditions in the Orient similar to those obtaining at this time in Korea. But, in fact, the

daily life in Seoul, as seen from the inside point of view, was at that time scarcely more like that of a well-ordered city in New England or the Middle West, than that described in the lurid tales of the *Arabian Nights*.

The task which Marquis Ito took upon himself when he began in earnest the effort to clean out these Augean stables, which had gone uncleared for more than five hundred rather than merely thirty years, required something more than the physical strength of Hercules, even when backed up by a modern army. And it was Ito's avowed policy never to use force when its use could possibly be avoided. Not only, however, were limitless evils to be remedied, but about every kind of economic and educational and political good had either to be constructed from the very foundations or radically reconstructed. There was no dependable currency or system of financing the government. There were almost no public highways or modern means of transportation and communication. There was no system of taxation, but only the regular or extraordinary squeezes, just now augmented by the corrupt dealings with the Emperor through dishonest court officials for the illicit procurement of concessions and other varieties of plunder. There was no national and respected code of laws, not even in the form of fairly equitable customs, whether as appertaining to the government in dealing with its own subjects, or to those subjects in their dealings with one another. Since the treaty relations of Japan to Korea provided only for a "protectorate," except in the matter of dealing with foreign governments, internal affairs must be largely conducted through native officials. But there were no natives that could be relied on to act as judges who would not receive bribes, or as ministers of state, honest, brave, and efficient. And, in a way most embarrassing and mischievous of all counteracting influences, were those exercised by some of the missionaries. In proof of this painful fact I select one of many verbal and factual instances of such influences. It is an anonymous letter written, alas! by a missionary and published in the *Seoul Press* of August 6, 1907, which contains, among other similar passages, this one:

The influence of Christianity, so largely and rapidly increasing in the country, holds out a better prospect of spontaneous reform than the outside, violent interference of a money-grabbing and hated heathen enemy.

But the representative of this hated "heathen enemy" was heavily subsidizing the Young Men's Christian Association in recognition of its services for the good of the Koreans; had, on the previous April, sent a gift of *Yen* 10,000 and a message of welcome to the "World's Christian Student Federation," and was doing his best to get into active co-operation with the Christian missionaries in Korea for the common effort at an uplift, in every respect, of the Korean common people.

For two troubled years the Resident General gave all his energies, guided by his best wisdom and coupled with his utmost patience, to the work of establishing the protectorate in a manner to secure the highest welfare of the common people of Korea, in connection with the peace and safety of his own country as against internal disorders and attacks from foreign nations.

It was the violation of the Treaty of November 1905, in July 1907, that gave the strong initial movement to the demand to convert the protectorate over Korea into the annexation of Chosen as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. This overt act resulted from the secret intrigues of three or four foreigners with the Korean Emperor and certain of his former officials (chiefly Yi Sung-sol who had once been cabinet councillor, Yi Chung-yong, formerly a judge of the Supreme Court, and Yi Wi-chong, at one time secretary to the foreign legation in Russia). The prominent foreigners were Mr. Hulbert, M. Plancon, the ex-secretary of Count Alexieff at Port Arthur, and Mr. Bethell, the editor of the *Seoul Times*. The act consisted in sending a delegation to the Hague Conference of that year, which was to obtain recognition as from His Majesty of Korea, bring formal complaint against the Japanese Government General, and ask of the Conference interference and redress. What the *Seoul Press* asserted on July 4, the day following the receipt at Seoul of the news of the appearance of this dele-

gation at the Hague,—namely, “When Mr. H. B. Hulbert left for Europe under peculiar circumstances there were rumors that he was charged by the Emperor of Korea with some political mission to the Hague”—had become known to the writer as early as the preceding May 8, in a truly dramatic, not to say, startling way. This was the evening of the day when the chief foreign manager of this business had suddenly left Seoul without giving to any of his most intimate friends among the missionaries any single satisfactory reason for his departure. But Miss Sontag, the plucky and faithful friend, as well as the efficient foreign housekeeper, of the Emperor, had found it out, though only in part. Suspecting the nature of the transaction on account of her rather intimate acquaintance with similar mistakes of her imperial friend in the past, she had that day gone to the palace determined to ascertain the truth from His Majesty’s own lips and if possible save him from his unwise and rash act. She boldly accused the Emperor of having again given a large sum of money to Mr. Hulbert to employ him in some kind of service which would surely react, as all the other commissions had before done, to his own lasting injury. At first the Emperor stoutly and totally denied the charge. But Miss Sontag courageously renewed the charge and when the Emperor denied it again, her reply was: “*Pour le moment, vous mentez, votre majesté.*” At this, the Emperor confessed that he had sent Mr. Hulbert on some sort of a mission, and for its success had given him a large sum of money. Whereupon the intrepid woman seized the Emperor by both his arms and, while the only court chamberlain present stood silent and trembling in the corner, implored him on her knees, as he valued his crown and its inheritance by his descendants, and the welfare of his kingdom, to summon back Mr. Hulbert by telegram from Japan where he was making a short stop on his way to St. Petersburg. But this the Emperor steadfastly refused to do. He also continued to lie when accused of having employed Mr. Bethell to assist in the plot. And he further continued to lie, in the effort to shift the responsibility on the Korean ministers, none of whom probably knew anything

about the matter—the real intriguers not daring to take them into the secret, even if they had not pretty well known that none of this body would for a moment have looked upon the plan with any favor.

Here again, the principal actor was an American citizen, a man who continued to the end to be associated, not only in the Japanese official and popular mind, but also in the mind of the American people, so far as they knew or cared anything about the matter, with the American missionaries. That the Korean people came to regard the same person as chiefly responsible for the plot which lost them such measure of independence and “saving of face” as was preserved under the cover of a “Protectorate,” was evinced by the fact that, when he subsequently made a visit to Korea in the interest of his real-estate holdings, a plot to assassinate him was formed, on the plea that Korean independence was forfeited, in fact, at the time of the appearance of the Korean delegation at the Hague. The Japanese Government promptly interfered with this plot and saw that their would-be destroyer and habitual traducer was conveyed in safety to China.

The excitement both in Tokyo and in Seoul, and especially in official circles everywhere in Japan and in Korea, which followed the news of this flagrant breach of treaty on the part of the Korean Emperor, was intense; the demand for his punishment and for some arrangement of the relations of the two countries which should make forever impossible the recurrence of anything similar was not to be disregarded. The only choice lay between strengthening Marquis Ito's hands and giving them much more authority for enforcing reforms, and immediate, forceful and undoubtedly bloody annexation. It was only with the utmost difficulty that the Resident General succeeded in steering the policy of Japan with Korea into the new attempt at reform for Korea without the complete sacrifice of any show of its political independence. The truthful story of the sequent events, in correction of numerous misstatements and falsehoods, is told, in its main outlines, in the book to which reference has already been made (*In Korea with Marquis Ito*, Chapter

XVIII, "July, 1907, and afterward"). These events having occurred after I had left Seoul are, however, strictly guaranteed by material furnished me by Durham White Stevens, who knew everything that any body else knew about the transactions between the two governments. In further explanation of what took place during this period I quote, however, from a long letter of his which opens with the following sentence: "The following is a résumé of occurrences leading up to the present situation in Korea." After telling of the arrival of Viscount Hayashi, who had been commissioned by the Japanese Government to proceed to Seoul and confer with the Resident General, and of the action of the Korean cabinet in forcing the abdication of the Korean Emperor, and of the arrangements for preserving the public safety during this impending crisis, the writer adds this postscript (July 25, 1907):

Since the foregoing was written a second decree became necessary since the Emperor began playing his usual double game. The second decree establishes beyond doubt the fact that he has abdicated. This morning the agreement signed last night by Marquis Ito and Prime Minister Yi Wan Yong was made public. However, when its provisions have been studied carefully and, moreover it is remembered that the agreement will necessarily authorize many things not specifically mentioned in the text, it will be seen that it is *almost* annexation. . . . The chief point is that the abdication was entirely Korean in origin and performance. Marquis Ito left them to work out their own salvation in that respect. After that he brought forward Japan's demands, and there can be no doubt that as one member of the Residency General put it, "the Japanese sword was somewhat dulled" by the Emperor's abdication.

As to the state of things in Korea under the new arrangement, I quote from a letter of a missionary friend, written September 6, 1907, who of all the missionary body was most active and effective in promoting the welfare of the Christian converts under their new relations to the Japanese Government.

There is some insurrection to the east and southeast of Seoul, but it is confined to a small area. There has been there the violence that always accompanies war. The insurgents are levying supplies on the poor people and forcing many into their ranks.

One of the chief sources of trouble are the Il Chin Hoi men who, by their schemes, are complicating matters for the Japanese. But the residency officials are on their guard and jack up the Il Chin men frequently.

In regard to the attack on myself in Bethell's paper, it was written by one of his reporters and was entitled "The pro-Japanese Missionary." It called me some insulting names and made it very unpleasant for me. In fact it was a cruel thing to do, for in the savage temper of the Korean soldiery, it practically invited them to assassinate me. I compelled Bethell to withdraw it in the following issue. . . . As to the article signed "Foreigner," it was written by an Anglican Church missionary named Gurney, I am told. The whole tone was so blackguardly, I felt it would be an insult to my Japanese friends even to treat his aspersions as serious matter. [It was, however, just such letters as this which, more than any other one thing, deceived the people in England and the United States, as to the temper and policy of the Japanese administration of affairs in Korea. Let it not be forgotten that this is what one missionary truthfully writes of the falsehoods of another missionary.]

As to the action of the Japanese hooligans in the search for the runaway Korean soldiers from the guards' barracks, they were soon in control. Marquis Ito said to me some time afterward in speaking of it: "As soon as I heard of it, I said that only Japanese police and soldiery are permitted to carry arms in Seoul. No Japanese has any more right to carry a weapon—not even a club—than a Korean, and both must be treated alike in the matter.

Somewhat more than a month later Mr. Stevens writes briefly of the situation as follows:

We hear that H—— is trying to incite the American commercial world against Japan by all sorts of stories concerning Japanese designs against American trade. It is even said that he has gone to San Francisco to assist in the work of the Exclusion League. . . . The work of administrative reforms here is proceeding steadily. The "righteous army" continues to give trouble in the country, but the disturbances from that cause are not nearly so serious as they were several months ago. The reports which come from foreign sources indicate that the people at large take no interest in the movement, although they suffer by it. The Cabinet recently advised all peaceful, law-abiding subjects to oppose the insurrectionists and all other unlawful characters by force. It seems strange that it should be necessary to give such advice to any people with a gleam of courage, but in Korea, where the majority have acquired the habit of submitting tamely to the bullying minority (no matter how insignificant) it is both natural and timely.

The Emperor has removed to the East Gate Palace. Now it

is said that the retired Emperor proposes to move to the Wedding Palace, about ten minutes distant from his son's new abode. You see we have the usual touch of comedy to relieve the dullness of life. It is a funny comment upon the charges made so frequently that the Emperor (retired) is a prisoner in his quarters. Now he is gadding about everywhere. What will be done concerning his proposed change of quarters (if he really does propose to make the change) has not yet been announced. It is very clear, however, that he will keep up the game of intrigue to the last.

That Marquis, now Prince Ito remained through all these troublous times steadfastly opposed to the formal annexation of Korea, and unswervingly devoted to the promotion of the welfare of the common people of Korea, I have the most indubitable assurances on record as proceeding from his own lips. I quote from my diary of Sunday, September 22, 1907:

Just as I was getting ready for church I was called to the telephone and a message from Furuya (Prince Ito's private secretary) asked if I would come at once to the Imperial Hotel for an interview with the Prince. I summoned a jinrickisha as quickly as possible, and on arrival was shown into the small waiting-room near the head of the stairs. While I was waiting, Baron Suyematsu appeared, and when I did not immediately recognize him, introduced himself, and we had some minutes' conversation, chiefly on the new decoration and on the propriety of translating by the term "Duke" rather than "Prince," the Japanese title just received by Ito, Yamagata, and Ōyama. After about twenty minutes Ito appeared at the back door of the small room and Suyematsu left. The Prince sat down in a chair at the small table used for the convenience of smokers, and opened the conversation by saying that he was leaving Tokyo that afternoon at two o'clock, but should stop two or three days at Ōiso, where he must attend to some of his private business before returning to Korea. He had given orders to Furuya and would instruct Mr. Stevens to prepare and send to me at Honolulu the material needed to prepare the chapters on recent events. This led on to his talking freely and somewhat extendedly as to his plans. They were unchanged; not only that, but so long as he had his Emperor on his side, he would never change them, not even if all the rest of Japan were against him. It would indeed be easy by force to crush down the present rebellion. But until the Korean people understood the intentions of the Japanese Government to give them justice and prosperity, the use of force would not avail really to pacify the country.

With reference to the missionaries, he illustrated his attitude and intentions in the following homely but forceful way. "Here," said the Prince, pointing across the table to a small dish which

he was using as an ash-receiver for his cigar, "is a miserable, misgoverned, oppressed and suffering human being, the average Korean of the common people; and I want to get at him and relieve him. But I am here," marking out a line with his left hand—"and I must travel along this road to reach him. The missionaries are there" (pointing to the right) "and they, too, want to help this same suffering human being. We both want to reach the same end; but our roads are different. The missionaries can not do what I can do. I can not do what they can do. I wish them success. I shall not cross over and stand in their way; but they must not cross over, leaving their own way, and get in my way. Our ends are the same, to do good to the Koreans; but our ways are different."

For nearly two years more Prince Ito struggled with his stupendous difficulties, making on the whole notable progress, but harrassed and hampered by the same unfavorable influences which have already been enumerated. These were the intrigues of the ex-Emperor and his corrupt court; the intrigues, seditions, and conspiracies, stirred by the Yang-bans and executed, with unsparing severity upon Koreans and Japanese alike, by roving bands of robbers and escaped soldiery; but most subtle and mischievous of all, the greed and craft of foreign promoters, and the credulous, though well-meant but really unwise opposition of the foreign teachers of religion, and their converts and home constituency. Among the latter, Americans were by no means the least conspicuous.

In 1909 Prince Ito resigned the Residency General and returned to Japan to take the leading place in the Privy Council of his own Emperor. But he had quite well started toward success one project which is likely to be of continuously increasing influence in cementing friendly and loyal relations between the province of Chosen and the rest of the Japanese Empire. When the Korean Emperor abdicated in 1907, his oldest son by the Queen succeeded to the place. But this man, although in age an adult, had never developed either in body or in mind much beyond the standard of early adolescence. The youngest son by the ill-famed concubine, Lady Om, was, however, a vigorous boy of eleven years. Him the Prince Ito rescued from the infamous crowd of eunuchs, concubines, and palace women, who were

just taking him in hand that they might, according to their traditional custom, make him impotent and imbecile, and became his revered and beloved foster-father and guardian. After much persuasion, the natural father of this youth became so far convinced that his son would not necessarily be strangled or poisoned, as to consent that Prince Ito should take the boy to Japan for an education worthy of the crown prince of Korea. The young man is now Prince Yi of Japan, and far likelier as a Japanese prince, when he becomes the head of the once imperial house of Korea, to be of real service to his native land than any of the ancestors of that house have been for a period of five hundred years.

Even before the resignation of Prince Ito, there was a significant outcry in certain quarters against his "altogether too gentle tactics." The land-grabbers, usurers, and other unscrupulous adventurers among the Japanese, were, quite naturally, no more favorable to the establishment of a system decreeing honesty and favoring justice than were the foreign promoters. The fixing of titles to real estate and of mining claims was a particularly vexatious sort of business. Many pieces had been sold two or three times over by their presumably rightful owners; and many more had passed through the hands of pretended but not the real owners. Some of the property in the hands of the missionary bodies had suffered this fate. Excessive tracts of land had been "appropriated" for military purposes during the Russo-Japanese war; and the process of releasing it and returning it to the crown lands did not, of course, meet with the cordial appreciation of all the army officers. Some of the more sensational journals of Tokyo had gone so far as to affirm that the reforms inaugurated by Ito were making no progress; that he had "failed to grasp the situation;" and even that he had "lost the confidence of the Emperor without gaining that of the nation." Most of this was as false as were the similar stories propagated by a section of the foreign business men and of the foreign missionaries. But especially costly and threatening was the insurrection started by the disbanded Korean soldiers and the regular

bandits, of whom there had always been a large number in Korea, as there are today a much larger number in China, who were persistently plundering and murdering both Japanese and their own countrymen. By 1909 this insurrection had cost more than 22,000 lives, and together with the funds provided for useful purposes, had taken out of the treasury of Japan more than \$72,000,000.

It was probably, however, the murder of Prince Ito on the 26th of October, 1909, which gave the final impetus to the resolve of Japan that nothing short of formal and complete annexation would suit the situation.

At what precise moment this conviction forced itself upon Japan's judgment, it is impossible to say. She knows how to keep her counsel. But it certainly was with great reluctance that she, hitherto the exponent and champion of Korean independence, accepted the rôle of annexation. Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*, p. 729.

It cannot truthfully be said that Japan has ever ruled Korea with the "mailed fist." It may perhaps truthfully be said that with the beginning years of annexation it ruled more than Ito had done, or could well do,—whether we regard chiefly his power or his wish—with an ungloved hand. Count Terauchi, who was sent to inaugurate this drastic step, taken on August 22, 1910, and who has since acted as the Governor of Chosen, was a military man, as Prince Ito was not. His management has been firm and has never hesitated to employ such force as seemed necessary to secure the public order and to suppress sedition and insurrection. It has never been cruel, however; and it has not neglected to foster the educative and moral influences, as well as the economic and political reforms, which are absolutely essential to secure the lasting welfare, or even the peaceful, not to say loyal, adherence to the Japanese Empire, of the great body of the Korean people. On the whole, it may be said amply to justify this estimate: "Under the able management of Count Terauchi, the evil conditions inimical to the prosperity and happiness of the people are fast disappearing. Comparative peace and order reign; and there appears to be no reason why the fruits of progressive civilization should

not ultimately be gathered in Japan's new province as plentifully as they are in Japan herself."

Under Count Terauchi's administration there has been one period, however, when the same misrepresentation in foreign quarters has operated heavily against the reputation, for wisdom, sincerity and justice, of the dealings of the Japanese Government with its annexed province of Chosen. The reference is, of course, to the Conspiracy Trial of 1912-1913. Perhaps more than anything else this experience should bring some slight feelings of regretful shame to those who, whether among the credulous and the deceived or among the crafty and the deceiving, took a prominent part in these misrepresentations. Here again, the truly patriotic American can not help being sorry that so many of his own fellow countrymen were so prominently concerned in the affair.

"The Conspiracy Case," as reviewed with extreme brevity in the official *Annual Report of Reforms and Progress in Chosen* for 1912-1913, may be thus described. While prosecuting a robber arrested in the North Heian Province, the fact was disclosed that a band of conspirators had been planning to assassinate Count Terauchi, Governor-General of Chosen. The police examination resulted in the arrest of 142 suspected persons, all but seven of whom, after examination by the Procurator of the Keijo Local Court, with the further exception of eleven more, were remanded for public trial on the charge of conspiracy to kill. At the first trial, which opened on June 28 and closed on August 30, sixteen of the accused were acquitted on "account of insufficiency of evidence," but Baron Yun Chi-ho, Yang Keuitaik, and five others, were sentenced to ten years penal servitude; and the remainder to penal servitude varying from five to seven years. The convicted prisoners appealed to the Keijo Appeal Court, which after sitting fifty-one times, acquitted 99 of the accused and reduced the number of years of imprisonment required in punishment of the remaining five. The convicted now appealed to the Higher Court of the Government-General for revision. This court transferred the case to the Taiku Appeal Court for a rehearing; and the latter, with only a slight modification in the

length of one of the sentences, re-affirmed its former decision. Another appeal to the Higher Court was then taken; and at last, on October 9, a final decision was reached and the lower court upheld.

The government was severely and not altogether unreasonably criticized for its conduct of the "Conspiracy Case," by those who had no personal interest in the accused, chiefly on these two grounds: first, the large number of persons arrested on suspicion, in comparison with the small number finally convicted; and, second, the complications, delays, and seeming suppression of evidence that characterized certain portions of the trial process. The force of these criticisms can, however, be greatly modified, if not altogether broken, by a more accurate knowledge of the facts and a clearer understanding of the whole bearing of the case. As to the first subject of criticism, the government had knowledge of the existence of a secret society, called *Sin Min Hoi*, which in the words of the public prosecutor was "first started in America by Korean residents in 1904. In the following year a branch of the society was organized in Chosen with Baron Yun as President and Major Lyn as Vice-President. It had a membership of 200,000 in Chosen, Hawaii, America, and Russia. The chief objects of the society were emigration to Chientao, establishment of a military school there, and the assassination of leading Korean and Japanese statesman."

These figures will not seem so appalling when we consider that assassination, and the formation of secret societies for this and other similar criminal purposes had been for centuries the forte of the Koreans; that the *Sin Min Hoi* had already, besides such notable instances as Prince Ito, Mr. Stevens, and several prominent Korean officials, made successful attempts upon the lives of approximately 1,000 of the *Il Chin Hoi*, its rival pro-Japanese society. Moreover, the government had just barely got the better of the armed forces of the insurrection; and the population, native, Japanese and foreign was in a decidedly panicky condition. If under similar circumstance our forces in the Philippines were to set about the task of arresting all the reasonably

suspected, in order to prevent a plot to murder the head official of the American government; or if the police of New York City, knowing that its mayor and leading officials were in imminent danger, were to set about the task in earnest, of "rounding up" all the suspected gangs of bomb-throwers and gun-men, it may well be doubted whether the number arrested would have any right to be much inferior.

The reason why so few of the suspected were, in the final trial, not convicted, was not the lack of evidence as to their membership in a society of assassins. The failure to convict was an honor rather than a disgrace to Japanese legal justice in Korea. The Japanese lawyers for the defense everywhere proved themselves quite the equals of the government's prosecuting lawyers; and the position which they held was well taken and skillfully maintained. Their pleading was that the crime, if any, of which the accused were guilty was not that of a plotted but, only through lack of opportunity unaccomplished, attempt to murder the highest official of the Japanese Government: it was, the rather, the much less terrible crime of belonging to a political association, one of whose purposes might, indeed, on certain occasions be the venture upon the policy of assassination—a policy which, however, in this particular case, had never even matured in the minds of the great majority of the accused.

As to the method of conducting the trial, a semi-official conversation between Count Terauchi and the British Ambassador Sir Claude MacDonald, at a meeting in Kyoto, is recorded in the *Seoul Press* of November 27, 1912. Sir Claude asked for an explanation on two points about which he had been puzzled and which had been much criticized in Great Britain as well as elsewhere. First: Why the judge, after making mention of some foreign missionaries in the open court, did not prosecute them; and, second, why the judge, when the missionaries proposed to vindicate their innocence, refused them permission. In reply, Count Terauchi, said, that, while the judge might have been lacking in tact in the manner of his reference to the foreign missionaries, the mention of them at all was due to the

fact that, in their confessions at the first examination the accused had implicated the missionaries; but that he had so little confidence in this part of the confession, as to think it quite unnecessary to delay the proceedings of the court by having it confuted. "What necessity was there for these foreign missionaries, universally recognized innocent, to stand and plead their innocence before the court?"

But the outcry raised against the government by the friends of the accused, both on personal and on religious grounds, was much more loud, wide-spreading and injurious to the credit of the Japanese management of Chosen. It was, however, fraught with more exaggeration and unreason, if not something worse. The report was telegraphed to the United States and published in its "religious press" that 6000 native Korean Christians had been arrested and were being tortured by the Japanese on the trumped-up charge of a conspiracy to murder Count Terauchi. And when one of the missionaries on the ground cabled "not six thousand but about one hundred," an officer of one of the missionary boards avowed his belief that the last report had been "doctored." No wonder that the *Seoul Press* mildly remarked, "To say that more than 6000 men have been arrested is more than exaggeration!" ("Monstrous lie," the same paper calls it.)

But this was by no means the most serious breach of international comity. An unsigned statement was submitted by some of the missionaries in Korea to the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference, in which it was denied that Christians *could* take part in such a conspiracy, simply because they were (professing) Christians; and the Japanese government was charged with a resolute purpose to "crush Christianity." "We now believe," say the writers, "that the programme as laid out extends to the point of wiping out the Christian movement in Korea." Even into the next year this absurd charge continued to be made by the religious press of the United States, enforced by private letters from interested parties (by no means always on religious grounds) resident in Korea. A New York weekly religious paper even went so far as to state

that the religious persecution in Korea was marked by "cruelties comparable to the rigors of mediaeval inquisitions;" and that the "real impulse to the terrific dragonnade was a fierce aversion to Christianity, and a determination to stamp out the Church in the province of Chosen." Not one of these statements is true, or ever had a shadow of truth for its shelter. They are further sad illustrations of what human history is constantly illustrating,—namely, that ecclesiastical and churchly affairs about as often and as lamentably fail of being conducted with a strict regard for honor and truthfulness, as do affairs commercial and political.

That Korean native converts were not incapable of such a crime, we may quote in evidence a letter of the Rev. Lord William Gascoyne-Cecil, published in the *London Times* and written after a visit to Korea. Speaking of the "confessions" of these converts, Lord Cecil says:

It was with mingled feelings of horror and gratitude that the missionaries heard the long list of crimes committed by those whom they had hoped were examples of righteousness. One man confessed a crime not so horrible to their ears as to ours, namely, that of murdering his infant daughter; another confessed a crime worse even to Korean ears than it is to our own, that of killing his old and infirm mother to escape from the burden of her maintenance. A trusted native pastor confessed to adultery; and of sexual sins, both natural and unnatural, there was no lack.

But we have ourselves heard similar confessions from trusted Koreans among the native Christians. And the proved fact was that the assassins of Ito and of Stevens and of numerous other victims were native converts; and the yet more telling fact that the Christian name and Christian associations had been deliberately and persistently used to promote and cover plots of sedition and assassination.

The charge that the government was deliberately proposing to stamp out Christianity in one of its provinces where it was recognizably most needed in its better forms, was a most ungrateful act,—to say the least hard thing about it. For both in Japan and in Korea the Japanese Government had for some years been liberally subsidizing Christian enterprises, wherever they seemed to it to be

doing real good in practical ways to the people. It would not have been surprising if the government had showed some resentment on this occasion; as any one can make clear to himself who will try to imagine how we should feel toward an equal number of Buddhist priests and their foreign converts, under similar circumstances, in one of the states of our Union. The attitude of Prince Ito toward the Christian institutions established by foreign associations in Korea had been made sufficiently clear; and under the administration of Count Terauchi, Chief Justice Watanabe, himself a prominent member of the very denomination of the native Korean converts to which about four-fifths of the conspirators belonged, testified in the *Oriental Review*:

The educational authorities have never objected to or impeded the propagation of Christianity. On the contrary, I have observed the Governor General has taken every opportunity to come into friendly contact with the missionaries visiting Seoul or living in Korea.

And the *Seoul Press* quite effectually disposed of this absurd charge by inquiring why, if the government wished to extirpate Christianity in general, it confined its efforts so closely to arresting the converts of a single missionary body.

But the previous character of many of the men arrested was a sufficient answer to all attempts at a wholesale clearance of the band, whether professed converts or not, from the charge to excite sedition and conspiracy to murder. In this connection it should be again remembered that assassination was for a long time the recognized method of bringing about any changes in the government of Korea; and that while none of the foreign religious teachers could be reasonably even suspected of taking part in this conspiracy case, few indeed of them had ever ventured to speak plainly about the crime of political murder.

To give a few instances under this general statement. Several of the accused were distinctly proved to have been the intimate followers of one An Tai-kuk who had been acting in Korea as the head agent there for the parent society formed in America. One convict, Kang Poong-oo, was

forced to display in court his right hand, one of the fingers of which had been cut off to enforce the expression of his pledge of fidelity to death in the interests of the society. Another, Yang Keuitak, was at the time an inmate of the Seoul prison, had been connected under Mr. Bethell with the most notorious work of the native edition of his paper, the *Mai Il Sinpo*; and had been arrested for misappropriation of the National Debt Redemption Fund. Major Lyn had been educated at the military school in Tokyo at the government's expense, but had resigned and fled abroad under suspicion of being connected with a previous plot. Im Chi-chong, although he had been the superintendent of a Christian school, had placed himself on record as highly appreciative of the work of the assassin of Prince Ito. Song Chah-yon, who declared himself a Christian, had already been convicted of armed burglary, but had been released from prison on account of the special amnesty in connection with the annexation. Several of the accused were quite unable to give any plausible explanation of the pistols either found in their possession or known to have been buried or otherwise hidden by them.

It was the case of Baron Yun Chi-ho, however, which excited most interest, and provoked the most hostile criticism of the Japanese Government, in the Christian circles of Korea. Baron Yun was without doubt rather unusually talented and he had certainly enjoyed unusual opportunities for education and political preferment. When a boy he had spent three years in Doshisha, had studied in Shanghai and in America, where he graduated from the Theological College at Cincinnati. He had been Chancellor of the Korean legation at Washington, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vice-minister of Education, in his own country. He was at the time Vice-president of the Korean Y. M. C. A. On the other hand, his domestic and political surroundings and associations were of a very suspicious, not to say, wholly disreputable character. His father was a peasant who had seized the opportunity of a political revolution in Seoul, by siding with the pro-Russians and murdering some of the men of the other party which was in

power, to enrich himself and secure an appointment to the Korean ministry. Baron Yun had already been known as a man of weak and shifty moral character, inordinate self-conceit, combined with pleasing manners and attractive bearing.

That Yun Chi-ho perjured himself, not only at the time either of his confession or of its retraction, but also when he swore that he believed the Sin Min Hoi to be an innocent society for the promotion of education, and that the meetings held at his house were for the study of the Bible, there can be little doubt. When he, with the other conspirators finally sentenced to prison, was pardoned some months ago, he confessed an entire change of heart toward Japan and its government in Korea, and professed penitence for his behavior in the past. He was very soon arrested again on the charge of one of his own countrymen, of having swindled the plaintiff out of a large sum of money.

It will not surprise anyone who knows the Koreans and the style of government with which they were familiar under their native dynasty, to know that, with one or two exceptions, the accused all confessed guilt (a number of them implicating the missionaries in their confession), at the preliminary examination; but when put on trial before the judge retracted, with a single exception, their confession, and stoutly denied every bit of evidence brought against them,—alleging “unbearable torture” as having wrung from them their unwilling admission of guilt. The native custom, imported from China, had been quite generally to extort confessions by torture; and the cheapest way out of any accusation in the early stages, whether innocent or not, was promptly to confess and escape the torture.

It would probably be too much to maintain that not a single case of somewhat rough handling of the accused occurred at any stage of the trials of the conspiracy case. But that anything like persistent torture to excite confession was practiced on any one of the prisoners was distinctly disproved, not only by the official denial of the government, but by the testimony elicited. Some of the prisoners had sworn that their thumbs were tied together

and they were then hung up; others claimed to have been escorted to Namsan when the snow was falling; still others that their bodies were pinched with hot tongs, etc., etc. But the testimony of the police inspector showed that such things were impossible under the conditions of the examination. No marks of torture could be discerned by the friends who visited them in prison, or at the time of their release, respectively, from imprisonment. Marked improvement in health was made by almost every prisoner during the term of his confinement. The only definite instrument of torture, proved actually to have been on the spot, was described by one of the witnesses (who showed the weakness of which he complained to the court as the cause of his false confession by bursting into tears and saying that he wished to see his mother) as "some ropes hanging from the window." These were the ropes for raising the window-blinds.

We have dwelt at such unseemly length on this unseemly episode, because, although in itself comparatively unimportant, the storm of it as bruited abroad in America and elsewhere in the Christian world, has probably done more than any other one thing to discredit the Japanese government in Korea, among those whose good opinion this government, and the Japanese nation generally, may most properly wish to secure and maintain. But no one can go twice through the entire court proceedings as officially published, and do it with a fair mind (and this the writer of the present article has faithfully tried to do), without concluding that, although its management was at certain points needlessly tactless, it was fairly conducted; and that fewer of the accused who deserved it, got any punishment, and that they got less of punishment than they deserved.

If one familiar with the conditions in Korea only a short decade ago were to visit the Province of Chosen today, one would not fail to be greatly impressed with the important changes which have taken place—and almost without exception for the better. Since the eventful night in November, 1905, when Marquis Ito completed the formal engagement which inaugurated the Japanese protectorate over Korea, a sound system of finance and a dependable

currency has been established; railroads, highways, wharfs, steamboat lines and other means of communication have been built up; afforestation and improvements in methods of agriculture and the introduction of new crops have gone on apace; the old chaotic condition of squeezes has given place to an equitable and not excessively burdensome system of taxation; a judiciary on which a creditable amount of reliance can be placed for the securing of justice has been appointed; primary schools and institutions for manual training have been established in large numbers; sanitary conditions have been greatly improved and an increasing number of native physicians is being educated in the knowledge and methods of modern medical science; the Japanese and Korean native Christians are continually making more successful advances toward coöperation for the religious welfare of their common country; and the foreign missionary associations, emerging from their period of more sensational methods of advertising and of multiplying the numbers of their "converts," are in reality founding much more intelligent and trustworthy churches and other Christian institutions. The correct picture is not, indeed, all rose-colored: that could scarcely be reasonably expected. But it is such as amply to justify the words already quoted from Captain Brinkley.

The experiences of Japan in Korea afford a most interesting and instructive study in "Race Development" under the conditions of modern civilization. We have the regular stages—we might almost say, the necessary stages in this sort of development. A stronger nation finds its ambitions and greed excited, or its interests impeded and its advancement checked, or its safety jeopardized, by a weaker nation. It proceeds to interfere in the affairs of the weaker nation. This leads on the attempt at some sort of a protectorate; and the attempt at partial control through a remaining even partially independent government is pretty apt to be followed by annexation or the equivalent of full annexation. If these steps are ever warranted—and I think we must admit that they sometimes are, in the vital and permanent interests of both nations—a rather unusually good plea

for their warrant can be made out in the case of Japan's dealings with Korea.

But the final and complete justification of all such forms of race development is to be determined only when the lasting effects are made clear, not only in the interests of the stronger, but perhaps even more especially in the interests of the weaker nation. If these are not secured and safeguarded, not only the morality but also the real success of the attempt must be called in question; and not less in the real interests of the stronger nation. To avoid the disaster of a final failure, the Japanese government has thus far, in some important respects, acted very wisely. It has refrained from trying by force to suppress the Korean language and the traditional customs, where they were simply foolish and superstitious, while not necessarily inimical to the public order. It has directed its efforts in education chiefly toward rendering the common people industrious and self-supporting, rather than raising a superfluity of half-learned *babus*, after the mistake of the British Government in India. Greatly on the side of hope is the fact that the mixture of races in the two peoples is not radically different, although different in its proportions. If Korea must continue to be held in check by what its people continue to feel as a foreign force, Japan, however successful it may seem to itself to have been in other ways, must be held ultimately to have failed signally. But if what the writer and what one of the shrewdest of the American business men in Korea, thought most likely to happen, comes to be in fact true, namely, that in less than fifty years from now, no one, except as a matter of abstract interest in his genealogical table will raise the question whether the blood in his veins is mostly Japanese or mostly Korean; then both peoples, as one nation, will have made a notable success in this problem of race development. For the problem is never solved until it is solved in mutual good will, and complete understanding and sympathy.